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Abstract 
Modern computer systems are plagued with security flaws, 
making them vulnerable to various malicious attacks. Intrusion 
detection systems have been proposed to protect computer systems 
from unauthorized penetration. Detecting an attack early on pays 
off since further damage is avoided and resilient recovery could be 
adopted. An intrusion detection system monitors dynamic program 
behavior against normal program behavior and raises an alert when 
anomaly is detected. The normal behaviour is learnt by the system 
through training and profiling.  
However, all current intrusion detection systems are purely 
software based and thus suffer from huge performance degradation 
due to constant monitoring operations inserted in the application 
code. Due to the potential performance overhead, software based 
solutions cannot monitor the program behavior at a very fine level 
of granularity, thus leaving potential security holes as shown in [5]. 
In this paper, we propose a hardware-based approach to verify the 
control flow of target applications dynamically and to detect 
anomalous executions. With hardware support, our approach offers 
multiple advantages over software based solutions including near 
zero performance degradation, much stronger detection capability 
(a larger variety of attacks get detected) and zero-latency reaction 
upon anomaly and thus much better security.  
 
Categories and Subject Descriptors:  
D.3.4 [Programming Languages]: Processors—Run-time 
environments, Optimization, Code generation. 
General Terms: Performance. 
Keywords: Anomaly Detection, Control Flow Graph, System Call 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern computers are plagued with security flaws. Potential 
holes like software bugs, misconfigurations, misuses etc., render 
computer systems vulnerable to malicious attacks in a networked 
environment. In recent years, CERT has observed more than 
double vulnerabilities being discovered each year accompanying a 
dramatic increase of intrusion activities [1]. 
Intrusion detection 
To protect computer systems from unauthorized penetration, 
intrusion detection system is one of the techniques to identify such 
attempts. Due to the following reasons, intrusion detection has 
become an indispensable means to help secure a networked 
computer system. 1) A completely secure system is impossible to 
build. 2) Protecting the software itself through cryptographic 
mechanisms, such as in the XOM [8] architecture, cannot prevent 
software’s internal flaws, which might be exploited by deliberate 
intruders. 3) Other operational mistakes, like misuses, 
misconfigurations etc., may jeopardize the systems as well. 
 Misuse detection and anomaly detection 
Traditionally, intrusion detection can be classified into 
misuse detection and anomaly detection. Misuse detection tries to 
identify known patterns of intrusions with pre-identified intrusion 
signatures, while anomaly detection assumes the nature of the 
intrusion is unknown, but will somehow deviate the program’s 
normal behavior. Misuse detection is more accurate, but suffers 
from its inability to identify novel attacks. Anomaly detection can 
be applied to a wide variety of unknown (new) attacks, however 
the distinction between normal behavior and anomaly must be 
properly defined to reduce the number of false positives (or false 
alarms). This paper will focus on anomaly detection. 
A number of anomaly detection techniques have been 
proposed in the security domain. Most early anomaly detection 
approaches analyze audit records against profiles of normal user 
behavior. In their groundbreaking paper [2], Forrest et al. found 
out that system call trace is a good way to depict a program’s 
normal behavior, and anomalous program execution tends to 
produce distinguishable system call traces. They record all normal 
N-grams, i.e. N consecutive system calls, during the learning phase, 
and use them to detect anomalous system call sequences in runtime. 
Later, [6] and [7] aim to represent the normal N-grams compactly 
with finite-state automata (FSA). Recent advances [3][4][5] 
suggest to include other program information to achieve faster and 
more accurate anomaly detection. R. Sekar et al. [4] combines the 
program counter with system call names, so that the state machine 
becomes deterministic and more accurate. D. Wagner et al. [3] 
proposed several anomaly detection models based on static 
analysis of the program code. Their call graph model builds up a 
non-deterministic finite-state machine (NDFA) extracted from 
system calls on the call graph. Call graph model guarantees no 
false positives, but may contain impossible paths that might be 
exploited by the attacker. Thus, they further proposed the abstract 
stack model, which involves a pushdown NDFA. Recently, H.H. 
Feng, et al. [5] put forward a new system-call based approach, 
which constructs a return address table and a virtual path 
(procedure entry/exit points traversed between two system calls) 
table during the training phase and detect anomalies afterwards. 
Although anomaly detection through system call monitoring 
has been shown to perform moderately well, several 
aforementioned papers [2][5] suggest that to detect more subtle 
attacks, approaches with finer granularity should be taken with 
consideration to more control flow information. However, current 
software anomaly detection systems already suffer from huge 
performance degradation due to inserted monitoring code, even 
operating at system call granularity. It is infeasible to extend 
granularity further in a software based solution. Moreover, the 
anomaly detection software can be attacked itself like any other 
software, leading to security weakness.  
In this paper, we propose a hardware-based approach to 
monitor the control flow graph of the target programs and to detect 
anomalous executions. Our approach offers multiple advantages 
over software based solutions including near zero performance 
degradation, much stronger detection capability and zero-latency 
reaction upon anomaly thus much better security.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives 
background knowledge and summarizes related work; section 3 
introduces the XOM machine model on which our work is based; 
section 4 elaborates our hardware dynamic control flow 
monitoring scheme; section 5 discusses subtle issues in our scheme; 
section 6 presents experiments and results; and section 7 concludes 
the paper. 
2. Motivation and Related Work 
The goal of anomaly detection is to maximally distinguish 
between normal and abnormal behavior. In other words, it should 
seldom trigger false positives (false alarms) for normal behavior 
and it should detect the anomaly maximally or reduce false 
negatives (undetected attacks) as much as possible.  
It has been well acknowledged that monitoring program 
behavior dynamically is a good means to detect anomaly. 
Naturally, program behavior includes function calls generated at 
runtime, data accessed during the execution, etc. Researchers have 
shown that a great number of attacks can be thereby detected by 
analyzing program trail during its execution. 
To illustrate the pros and cons of existing approaches, we 
first introduce the buffer overflow attack, and then evaluate the 
detection capability of a variety of techniques. 
(b) (c) 
 
int read_input_file (FILE *fp) { 
char buffer[256]; 
 
while(fgets(buf, 400, fp)){ 



















Figure 1. Buffer overflow attack. 
Buffer Overflow Attack 
Figure 1.a shows a code segment, which illustrates buffer 
overflow attack. The main function opens a file, reads data from 
the file and finally closes the file. In function 
read_input_file(FILE* fp), the fgets function reads data from the 
file to a local buffer for further processing. However, due to a 
programmer mistake, the size of the read-in data may exceed the 
boundary of the buffer (such a thing can also happen  if one uses 
gets()  which keeps reading until end of line or file and can result 
in overflow) . Thus, the attacker manipulated input can overflow 
the buffer and overwrite other critical data also on the program 
stack deliberately, such as the return address of the function. Thus, 
when the function returns, the execution flow can be directed to 
the malicious code injected by the attacker. Also, parameters or 
other local variables can also be easily overwritten to create 
security holes. For example, sensitive data might be exposed or 
super user privilege might be granted illegally. 
Anomaly Detection via System Call Monitoring 
System calls are generated as the program interacts with the 
kernel during its execution, such as the fopen, fgets, fclose in 
Figure 1.a. [2] argues that system call trace might be a good 
starting point for detecting anomaly. System call trace can be 
considered as a distilled execution trace, leaving many program 
structures out. As can be seen from Figure 1, if the return address 
on stack is tampered, the program cannot return to the normal 
program point after read_input_file in function main and call 
fclose, instead, the malicious code might invoke other system calls, 
for example fork, in order to damage the system, which means the 
system call trace is likely to be discernible from the normal case. 
Although system call trace is a great simplification of the whole 
program activities, storing and checking against all normal system 
call traces is a tremendous design effort. The classical solution is 
based on FSA [6][7]. 
System Call Monitoring Based on FSA 
1. S0 
2. while(…) 
3.     S1; 
4.     if(…)S2; 
5.     else S3; 
6.     if(S4)…; 
7.     else S2; 






















Figure 2. FSA with pc as states. 
Next, we give an example to explain how FSA techniques 
work and the previous work on incorporating additional program 
information into the FSA model to improve detection capability. 
In Figure 2, each program statement invoking a system call 
becomes a state on the state machine diagram. The transitions 
between states are triggered by system calls. Each transition edge 
in the FSA is labeled by the triggering system call and the target 
state is determined by the feasible control flow. The state machine 
can be easily constructed through static analysis of the program [3] 
or dynamic learning of the system call trace and program counter 
[4]. The state machine is typically non-deterministic, e.g. the state 
3 on Figure 2.b may lead to state 4 or state 5 after S1 is called. A 
non-deterministic state machine can be converted to a 





























Figure 3. Impossible path problem and FSA with pc and 
return address stack (modified example from [4]). 
One significant property of establishing the FSA based on 
static program analysis is that no false positives will be generated, 
due to the conservative nature of static analysis. Thus, all normal 
executions will not trigger alarms and if the state machine reaches 
the error state, there is a guarantee that  something is anomalous. 
The above basic FSA model has the weakness of impossible 
path problem[3], which is illustrated in Figure 3.  
In Figure 3.a, function f() is called twice in function g(), 
therefore we will have the FSA constructed as in Figure 3.b. If 
buffer overflow happens in f(), the attacker can change the return 
address to 5, which is an illegal path. However, from the FSA 
constructed, the path from state 1 to state 6 to state 5 is still legal, 
leaving the buffer overflow undetected. In other words, syscall 
trace S0,S2,S1 becomes possible in this code segment. Figure 3.c 
shows how the abstract stack model [3] solves this problem. It 
maintains a return address stack along with the FSA. In the 
example, when we take the path from state 1 to state 6, 3 is pushed 
to the stack. Upon transition from state 6 to state 3, we pop the top 
of the stack and check if it accords with the new state. In this way, 
path from state 1 to 6 to 5 is found to be invalid because the pop-
up state does not match the destination state after the transition 
from state 6 to 5. 
However, [5] points out that even the call stack model can 
miss important anomaly. In Figure 4, although the condition in line 
2 is false, i.e. this is not a super user, the attacker can cause a 
buffer overflow to return from f() to line 7 instead of line 4, which 
actually grants him super user privilege. This attack is not 
detectable under abstract stack model, since the system call trace 
as shown in Figure 4.b is the same as an execution path going from 
line 2 to 6 to 8 to 7, which is a legal path for super user. The above 
example shows that the granularity at system call level is not fine 











3.   f(); 





8.  s2; 















Figure 4. FSA with return address stack (simplified example 
from [5]). 
To detect such anomaly, more program information, esp. 
control flow information, has to be incorporated. Recently, [5] 
proposes to constructs two hash tables to store not only the return 
addresses but so-called virtual paths. Virtual paths record 
procedure entry/exit points traversed between two system calls. By 
keeping tracking of more program information at runtime, 
detection capability is improved (the example in Figure 4 is shown 
to be detectable). However, the approach in [5] is still unable to 
detect attacks with finer granularity. 
 1. if(!superuser){ 2.   f(); 
3.   return; 
4. } 
5. //become superuser 
6. execve(“/bin/sh”); 
//function f() 
8.  no syscall but overflows; 
//function g() 
 
Figure 5. A simple example to evade anomaly detector in [5] 
Figure 5 shows a simplified example extracted from [5]. 
When there is no system call in function f(), a buffer overflow 
attack can easily escalate the privilege without being detected 
Control Flow Monitoring 
As concluded in [5], the ability of anomaly detections 
systems heavily relies on the granularity it monitors. An anomaly 
detector solely relying on system call trace is crippled if an attack 
takes place between two system calls. Also, it is easy to think 
about other examples that can foil the anomaly detector even if 
limited program control flow information is considered, such as 
the example in Figure 5. 
We argue that a granularity at control flow level is fine 
enough to detect most possible attacks. Most attacks would require 
a change in program control flow. We believe tampering a 
program without changing its control flow is very difficult. For 
integer programs, normally there is a change in control flow (a 
jump like instruction) in every 6 to 10 instructions, which means 
control flow level is very fine grained. To enforce control flow 
level monitoring and detection, first we need to make sure the 
program is sequentially executed except when jump instructions 
are encountered. Jump instructions include branch instructions, 
function calls/returns and any other instructions that could change 
program PC in a non-sequential way. For jump instructions, the 
anomaly detector should further verify whether the jump target 
follows the program normal behavior. This includes checking 
whether the jump target is possible and normal. For direct branches 
and direct function calls, the jump target is known during 
compilation. For indirect jumps, the compiler can determine a set 
of possible jump targets through pointer analysis. In real programs, 
an indirect jump will not have many possible targets. In fact, many 
of them have only one possible target. Jumping to other impossible 
targets surely implies anomaly. Moreover, through profiling we 
find the most commonly taken target(s) for a given jump and use 
that as a normal behavior. For each function return instruction, we 
should keep track of the call site it corresponds to and make sure 
the execution is back to the correct call site. By doing so, tampered 
return address on the stack through buffer overflow can be easily 
detected. 
Obviously, control flow level monitoring achieves the finest 
granularity among all anomaly detection techniques proposed so 
far. It subsumes the system call trace based anomaly detection 
since all paths between two syscall calls are verified, down to basic 
block level. Performing detection at such a low level brings great 
potential to detect future attacks exploiting subtle control flow 
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deviations. As shown in Figure 5, only one anomalous return 
grants the attacker super user privilege. 
Drawbacks of the Software Solutions 
Though it is obvious that finer monitoring granularity brings 
better detection capability, up until now, no solution based on 
control flow level monitoring has been proposed. The major reason 
is the performance overhead. Software based anomaly detection 
systems suffer from huge performance degradation due to inserted 
monitoring code, even operating at the system call granularity. 
According to our experience, a FSA based software anomaly 
detector can degrade the performance of monitored program by 
tens of times. For example, with monitoring enabled, sending an 
email using sendmail program takes around several tens of minutes 
[3]. Moreover, anomaly detection software, as any software, can be 
attacked itself. Thus, the security for the whole system can be 
hardly guaranteed. 
The above arguments prompt us to implement control flow 
level monitoring at hardware level. In this paper, we propose a 
hardware based anomaly detection system monitoring at control 
flow level. Our approach offers multiple advantages over software 
based solutions including near zero performance degradation, 
much stronger detection capability and zero latency reaction upon 
anomaly thus much better security.  
3. Introduction to XOM Secure Processor 
Model 
In this section, we introduce the well-known XOM secure 
processor model [8], which has been widely accepted in the secure 
architecture domain. Our hardware anomaly detection system is 
based on XOM. 
Under XOM model, only the central processor chip is 
assumed to be secure. The processor securely possesses the private 
part of a public/private key pair. The private key is the root of the 
security in XOM model. A session key for symmetric 
encryption/decryption is chosen by the software vendor every time 
the software is released to the customer. All the code and data of 
the software are initially encrypted using the session key. The 
session key itself is encrypted using the customer processor’s 
public key then decrypted by the processor. Symmetric encryption 
is used to reduce the overhead of decrypting the possibly huge 
program code and data. XOM model provides fundamental support 
for copy protection since the released program binary (encrypted 
using the session key) can only be executed on the right XOM 
processor (the wrong processor will get the wrong session key). 
Memory integrity checking is introduced later in the XOM model 
to further enhance its security [10][11]. Integrity checking 
guarantees that the contents in external memory cannot be 
modified by an external attacker without being detected. 
To support multiple processes, a session key table is stored 
on chip to distinguish different processes. Once the execution of 
the current process is interrupted, the processor automatically 
encrypts and hashes all on-chip shared data like registers and 
stores the hash value along with the session key entry for that 
process. When the process is resumed, the processor restores the 
on-chip shared data and verify its validity. 
Under XOM model, OS is not trusted. But there is a secure 
kernel residing in the processor and is trusted. Secure kernel has 
higher privilege than the untrusted OS and has access to all XOM 
hardware components like session keys and secure on-chip 
memory. Secure kernel provides basic supports for 
encryption/decryption, data tagging etc. and implements several 
special instructions for XOM mode, for example, enter_xom and 
exit_xom.  
The current XOM model is able to guard against attacks on 
hardware components, e.g., attacks on insecure bus or external 
memory. It also protects programs from being exposed and 
tampered by other malicious processes (including the OS) running 
on the same processor. However, the XOM model is unable to 
detect intrusions, because intrusions take advantage of software 
bugs like buffer overflows, or misconfigurations, misuses etc., of 
the victim program. During intrusions, the attacker does not have 
to tamper the program first. On the other hand, the attacker 
exploits the problems in the program itself or the improper usage 
of the program and utilize the program to against itself. Under 
XOM model, the processor is completely unaware of the bugs or 
the misuses of the program. For example, upon a buffer overflow, 
the XOM processor will overwrite the call stack for the attacker, 
thinking it just performing common loads/stores for the program. 
XOM does not undertake bounds checking of the input and thus it 
is possible to send long strings to overwrite return addresses  
launching buffer overflow kind of attacks. Although it may be  
difficult to slip in malignant code, one could still crash the 
application leading to denial of service attack. Moreover, XOM 
model obviously cannot prevent misuses or misconfigurations of 
the program.  
In our approach, isolation between different processes is still 
required. Also, the normal behavior profile must be initially stored 
in memory and must be immune from tampering. Hence, the XOM 
model forms a proper infrastructure for us to monitor control flow 
dynamically. 
4. Hardware Based Dynamic Control Flow 
Monitoring 
In this section, we elaborate our hardware based anomaly 
detection system, operating on program control flow level. Our 
approach achieves much better performance over software based 
solutions, since the monitor is entirely implemented in hardware 
and works in parallel with the instruction execution. While in 
system call tracing based software approaches, intercepting syscall 
alone can incur 100% to 250% overhead [4]. According to our 
experiences, the real performance degradation may reach tens of 
times. Our approach also achieves much stronger detection 
capability since we monitor the program at control flow level, 
which cannot be done in software without huge performance 
degradation. Finally, our approach offers much better security. The 
hardware is able to act immediately once an anomaly  is detected, 
thus guarantees to prevent further damages to the system. In other 
words, our system offers intrusion prevention ability. Intrusion 
prevention cannot be achieved by software solutions, since it is not 
realistic for software solutions to monitor on instruction level. The 
granularity that a software solution can achieve is much larger, 
thus there is a delay between anomaly occurrence and anomaly 
detection. For example, for software anomaly detection systems 
monitoring system call traces, the anomaly will not be detected 
until the next system call. The delay could be utilized by the 
attacker and the system may have been tampered before the attack 
is detected and any action is taken. In addition, since our detector 
resides in the XOM processor, the attacker is not able to tamper the 
detector itself. As against this, in software based approaches, the 
anomaly detector is simply another program that is subject to all 
kinds of malicious attacks. Finally, unlike software based 
approaches, our anomaly detection system does not assume OS is 
secure and un-tampered. Our assumption is consistent with the 
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assumption of XOM model. Thus, under our approach, the OS is 
nothing but another software and it can be monitored too. 
4.1 Architecture Overview 
Figure 6 shows an overview of the components in our 
hardware anomaly detection system. Some components are 
inherited from the XOM machine model. By integrating dynamic 
control flow checking with XOM, we add anomaly detection 
ability to XOM. On the other hand, our scheme heavily relies on 
data confidentiality and integrity guarantee of XOM.  
The processor chip (upper part) is physically secure and the 
memory (lower part) is subject to attacks. Inside the processor chip 
(shown in the upper left box), the processor maintains two master 
keys and a table records 3 entries for each process. On the upper 
right part, all process private data is stored. This area is saved and 
restored upon context switches. In addition to the processor 
pipeline, caches and other components, a detector accepts 
dispatched  instructions and checks them against normal behavior 
profile and the RA stack. The checking is done in parallel with the 
instruction execution to reduce performance overhead. However, 
unless the checking is done, the instruction being checked cannot 
retire from the processor. We assume in-order retirement. Thus, we 
guarantee that any instructions following an anomalous instruction 
cannot change machine state. In other words, our system can 
prevent intrusion at the very beginning of it, offering much better 
security. As an example, in buffer overflow attack, the anomalous 
return instruction will be captured during its execution and the 
control flow will not be directed to the malicious code. The 






























Figure 6. Architectural overview for dynamic control flow 
monitoring. 
There are two master keys (the private part of public/private 
key pair) stored on-chip. One is called master execution key and 
the other is called master checking key. The program is encrypted 
using a session key contained in the execution header. The 
execution header is in turn encrypted by the corresponding public 
key of the master execution key. On the other hand, the normal 
behavior profile is encrypted with another session key contained in 
the ADS header. The ADS header is encrypted using the 
corresponding public key of the master checking key. To guarantee 
the integrity of the normal behavior profile, the authentic profile is 
signed by an authority. The authorities can be organized 
hierarchically and each software vendor can become a leaf of the 
trust hierarchy. Thus, each software vendor can generate normal 
behavior profile data for its software and sign it. The signature is 
then put into the ADS header. For clarity, we call the session key 
that is used to encrypt the program execution key and the one to 
encrypt the normal behavior profile checking key. Both of them are 
symmetric encryption keys that can be efficiently implemented in 
hardware. To support multi-processing, session keys of all active 
processes (either executing for stalled) are kept in a table, which is 
only accessible by the processor.  
Upon starting a new program, the OS should layout the 
program code, static data and the normal behavior profile in the 
process’s memory space, then a special instruction1 with pointers 
to the execution header (if encryption is enabled) and the ADS 
header (if control flow checking is enabled) is executed. A hash 
tree for integrity checking is constructed in the external memory 
and the root hash is verified with the one contained in the 
execution header. 
When a process is context switched, the hardware 
automatically encrypts the process’s private data, which includes 
the data that is normally saved during context switches and that is 
special for XOM and dynamic control flow monitoring, like the 
normal behavior profile entry point and the RA (return address) 
stack. The process private data may reside in the external memory. 
The integrity of the private data is guaranteed by integrity 
checking scheme. The root hash of an active process never goes to 
external memory and is recorded in the same tables as the session 
keys are. 
The detector utilizes the normal behavior profile and the RA 
stack to check instructions executed dynamically. Normal behavior 
profile contains several tables that record the normal execution 
trace the program follows. Upon reaching a jump instruction 
(defined in page 3), the detector searches the tables to determine if 
the control flow should jump and if it should, it further checks if 
the jump target is a valid and normal one. RA stack maintains all 
function return addresses above the current function on the call 
stack. Upon function calls, the return address is pushed to the RA 
stack for future checking when the function returns. RA stack also 
handles spilling/reloading return addresses when the on-chip area 
is not enough to hold all return addresses. 
Finally, although the normal behavior profile and the spilled 
RA stack are in the same virtual address space as the program code 
and data, the processor ensures the running program cannot touch 
the data, instead only the detector can access them and monitor the 
program behavior based on them. The address space for normal 
behavior profile and RA stack is known to the OS as reserved for 
anomaly detection, therefore no space should be allocated from 
this area to the program. Any instructions attempting to read/write 
this reserved space will be detected and stopped by the processor. 
In this way, we achieve complete protection of the normal 
behavior profile and spilled RA stack from being tampered by the 
malicious program. 
4.2 Checking Anomaly with Hardware 
We now elaborate the hardware design to manage normal 
behavior profile and the RA stack. As we know, only a small 
number of instructions (about 10%) can cause non-sequential 
execution of the program, i.e. they are jump instructions. However, 
such instructions are not uniformly distributed in the code, i.e. the 
number of non-jump instructions between two jump instructions 
                                                                
1 enter_xom (execution_header_pointer, ADS_header_pointer) 
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varies a lot. Another difficulty is that there are a variety of such 
instructions, like branch instructions, calls/returns, etc. Moreover, 
indirect branch instructions and indirect function call instructions 
can have many possible jump targets. On the other hand, the 
hardware design prefers simple, uniform data structure that can be 
handled efficiently.  
We notice that jump instructions have their special properties. 
The majority of jump instructions (80%-90%) are direct branches 
or direct call instructions. The jump target of such instructions is 
known during compilation time. Therefore, for such instructions 
we only need to record the offset of the jump target to the current 
PC address and two boolean values indicating whether a taken case 
is normal and whether a non-taken case is normal. Some jumps are 
not biased, thus both taken and not-taken are normal.  
Hash table is the natural way to store target address and 
normal behavior for direct jumps. To check a direct jump 
instruction, we first calculate the hash value of its address, then use 
the hash value as index to the hash table to retrieve the 
corresponding information. However, there are a couple of 
problems with a simple hash table design. First, a simple hash 
table cannot exploit the code locality. The hash table entries for 
two adjacent direct jumps could be far away. Moreover, the 
processor always fetches a cache block of data from external 
memory. Using a simple hash table, it is very possible that only 
one record in the fetched block is touched before its eviction, 
which is greatly inefficient. Second, hashing can cause collisions. 
To avoid fetching the wrong information for a jump instruction, 
each hash entry has to be tagged which could also waste space. For 
example, alpha processor has 64 bit address space, which means 
the tag field has 62 bits, whereas the offset field is only 21 bits. 
Due to the above reasons, our anomaly detection system abandons 
a simple hash table design and instead deploys a specially 
optimized one. 
Checking Pipeline in the Detection System 
Figure 7 shows an overall picture of our anomaly detector. 
During execution, each dispatched instruction is sent to the 
detector with its PC value (cur_addr) and the type of the 
instruction. The type can be “non-jump”, “direct branch”, “indirect 
branch”, “direct call”, “indirect call” and “return”. During decode 
stage, the type of the instruction can be easily obtained. For direct 
jumps, the offset field obtained during decode stage is added to 
cur_addr to get the target address (next_addr) and the next_addr is 
also sent to the detector. For indirect jumps, the target address 
(next_addr) generated may not be available when the instruction is 
dispatched, i.e., the target address has to be loaded into a register 
first. The target address will be sent to the detector as soon as it is 
available. By feeding the instruction into the detector as soon as it 
is dispatched, control flow checking and instruction execution can 
be performed in parallel and performance degradation is reduced 
as much as possible. Once the PC address (cur_addr) is available, 
the detector accesses the normal behavior profile to get the 
corresponding information. The accessing is done in parallel with 
instruction execution. Some of the dispatched instructions are 
wrongly speculated, the detector will check them anyway since the 
performance impact is minor and we achieve better security by 
checking more instructions. 
The first stage in the detector is called is_jump check. It 
verifies whether the instruction at cur_addr should be a jump 
instruction. If the detector finds that the current instruction is a 
jump but it should not be, there must be an anomaly. All non-jump 
instructions are not further checked after the first stage. After the 
first stage, we isolate return instructions from other jump 
instructions, since return instructions only need to be checked 
against the top of the RA stack. In the second stage called normal 
jump check, we check jump instructions that are not returns. In this 
stage, we perform group-wise hashing on the current PC address 
(cur_addr) so that all direct jumps without collisions after hashing 
can be verified. Next, special jump check checks all the jumps left 
out by the previous stages. At the end of the pipeline, we push the 
return address of a call instruction to the RA stack. Here, the call 
instruction has been verified to be valid. 
Checking stages are pipelined with frequently used stages 
stationed earlier. In Figure 7, is_jump check stages processes all 
instructions, but it can be done quickly. The is_jump stage filters 
all non-jump instructions to alleviate the burden of later stages. 
Similarly, normal jump check is slower and requires more data for 
checking purposes. However, it only looks at jump instructions, 
which constitute roughly 10% of all instructions. Slower input rate 
to this stage allows more time to be spent on each instruction 
without stalling the checking pipeline. Finally, special jump check 
is the slowest due to the irregularity of the data structure and poor 
locality in cache. But fortunately, very few instructions (less than 
2%) reach this stage, leading to a very long interval between two 
requests to this stage. To amortize the disparity of inter-request 
intervals, we assume small size request buffers exist between any 
two stages. In practice, request buffers with 10-20 entries are 
generally enough for such purposes even in the worst case. 
Function calls and returns are relatively infrequent events. 
Moreover, push and pop operations to RA stack can be done very 




















Figure 7. Control flow checking pipeline. 
is_jump Check 
is_jump stage checks all instructions against a table called 
is_jump_table, which is a part of normal behavior profile. As 
shown in Figure 8.a, the table is an array with M bits, where M is 
the number of instructions in the program. Each bit indicates 
whether the corresponding instruction is a jump instruction  (value 
1) or not (value 0). The address of the instruction being checked 
(cur_addr in Figure 7) is used as an index to retrieve the bit for 
that instruction. Obviously, since the array is directly indexed 
without hashing, it should have good spatial locality in cache. 
Secondly, the size of the array is much smaller than the original 
code, because only 1 bit is needed to represent an instruction (1/32 
of the original code size if the instruction is 32 bit long). The 
checking speed is largely decided by the time to fetch the 
corresponding bit. In the worst case, the bit is in external memory 
and it would take tens of cycles to fetch it. However, upon a miss, 
a whole cache block is brought into the cache. Assume the cache 
line is 32B, that could satisfy the first stage checking of 256 
instructions. Thus performance degradation should be minor.  
If an anomaly is detected in this stage, i.e. a non-jump 
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instruction is found to be a jump instruction or vice versa, the 
detector knows it is absolutely an attack and it raises a threat 
exception. The exceptions are securely handled by the secure 
kernel, which is explained later. 
Normal Jump Check 
Although only a small percentage of instructions reach the 
normal jump check stage, they are sporadically distributed. Since a 
simple hash table design has the drawbacks mentioned before, we 
propose groupwise hashing. In Figure 8.b, the instruction address 
is divided into two parts: group ID and group offset. Assume there 
are N groups and each group contains K entries, then the ith group 
starts at address i*K. Inside each group, the group offset is first 
hashed then indexed into one of the entries in the group. The 
advantage of groupwise hashing is: 1) hashing saves space for non-
uniformly distributed addresses of jump instructions. 2) hashing is 
only performed inside each group and each group has a number of 
sequentially stored entries. In this way, we can exploit more spatial 
locality, because adjacent branches are most likely in the same 
group, their information will be stored adjacently. Some branch 
addresses may be hashed to the same location, causing collisions. 
As we observe, with a reasonable hashing function and a proper 
setup of N and K, collisions rarely happen. In case of a collision, 
we indicate that the branch should be handled in the special jump 
check stage.  
The data structure is detailed in Figure 8.b, each entry in the 
table is defined as normal_jump_entry. Since only direct branches 
are considered in this stage, each entry needs to specify whether 
taken or not-taken is considered as normal behavior or they both 
are normal. These two bits are learnt through profiling and training. 
The third field is_special is to indicate if there is a collision after 
hashing. Since the normal behavior profile is generated statically, 
we know whether an instruction after hashing will cause any 
collision. If so, the corresponding jump instruction should be 
processed in next stage. In this way, normal_jump_entry does not 
need to have a tag field, which save space greatly. The last field is 
a 21 bit offset, which is the maximal offset length in Alpha’s 
instruction set.  
For each checking request, cur_addr is split into group ID 
and group offset to locate the corresponding entry in the 
normal_jump_table. After getting the entry, if is_special bit is set, 
the request is simply forwarded to the special jump check stage. If 
is_special bit is not set, and next_addr-cur_addr=size of one 
instruction, the jump instruction does not jump, we verify if the 
nottaken bit is set in the entry. If nottaken bit is set, then the 
execution flow is in its normal behavior, otherwise there is an 
anomaly and the attacker raises a warning exception. If next_addr-
cur_addr<>size of one instruction and next_addr-cur_addr<>the 
offset field in the entry, this jump instruction has jumped to some 
uncommon place, therefore the detector knows an attack is 
ongoing and raises a threat exception. Finally, if next_addr-
cur_addr<>size of one instruction and next_addr-cur_addr=the 
offset field in the entry, the detector further checks if the taken bit 
is set. If it is set, the execution is normal, otherwise the detector 
raises a warning exception. In conclusion, in cases 2, there must be 
an attack. In case 1 and case 3, it is possible that the anomaly is 
caused by some corner cases.  
In our scheme, we setup N and K properly so that each cache 
blocks contains normal branch information for each group. Thus, 
the branch information for a group is always fetched into the 
processor together, improving locality. Assume each cache block 
is 32B thus can contain 10 branch records. We assume only 8 of 
them are used to reduce collision. So each cache block records 
branch information for 8 branches. Assume on average, there is 
one branch instruction per 8 instructions, one cache block has the 
branch information for 64 instructions, i.e., 256B. Thus, in our 
design, the length of group offset is 8 bits. N =  M/28, K=10.  
Special Jump Check 
This stage handles all remaining instructions. They can be 
direct jumps that cause collisions in normal jump check stage, or 
indirect jumps (indirect branches, indirect calls etc.). To cover all 
cases, we construct a link list when collision happen--Figure 8.c.  
special_jump_entry stores the PC address (tag) of the 
corresponding entry so that colliding entries can be distinguished. 
Note, in our normal_jump_entry, there is no tag field. To record 
more than one jump targets, the size of a special_jump_entry is 
variable. The irregularity of data structure complicates special 
jump checking stage and leads to longer latency for each checking 
request in this stage. However, normally the number of possible 
targets is very limited (less than 3), and only less than 2% of 
instructions reach this stage, thus the performance impact is minor. 
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struct special_jump_entry *special_jump_table [P]
N: num of groups  K: num of entries in each group
struct normal_jump_entry {
  boolean taken,
  boolean nottaken,
  boolean is_special,







Figure 8. Data structure of the checking tables. 
RA Stack, Function Calls and Returns 
Function calls and returns involve operations on the RA stack. 
RA stack is simply a stack for pushing/popping return addresses. 
As shown in Figure 7, function returns are isolated after is_jump 
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check stage. Each return address of the return instruction is 
compared against the return address popped up from the top of the 
RA stack. If they do not match, the detector raises a threat 
exception. Function calls are nothing but direct or indirect branch 
instructions that are setting return address. They are checked in 
normal jump check and special jump check stages. After a function 
call instruction is checked, the detector pushes the return address 
of the function to the RA stack for later verification when the 
function returns. 
RA stack only has a limited number of entries on chip. Due 
to recursive function calls, the call stack depth of a program can be 
very deep. However, only several entries on the top of the stack are 
active during any period. Thus, we adopt the idea of register stack 
engine that has been implemented on the Itanium processor [18]. 
When the on-chip RA stack is close to be full, the detector 
automatically spills half of the return addresses that are at the 
bottom of the on-chip RA stack to a reserved and protected 
memory space. On the other hand, when the return addresses 
stored on-chip are almost consumed (popped up), the detector 
fetches (restores) some return addresses back to the on-chip area. 
In other words, the detector manages to keep the top portion of the 
RA stack always on-chip. Since all accesses are to the top of the 
RA stack, this mechanism can successfully hide the latency to 
spill/restore return addresses between on-chip and off-chip space. 
4.3 Handling  Anomalies by Secure Kernel 
As discussed above, the anomaly detector can raise two kinds 
of exceptions when an anomaly is detected. By threat exception, 
the detector indicates that there must be an attack ongoing. By 
warning exception, the detector indicates that there may be an 
attack or some corner cases not seen in training/profiling. The 
exceptions are handled by the secure kernel residing in XOM 
processor. Upon a threat exception, the secure kernel can dump 
current execution and detection context, such as the process private 
data, key table, etc., for further intrusion analysis, then halt the 
whole system to prevent further tampering to the system. Upon a 
warning exception, the secure kernel can respond in a less 
offensive way. It can estimate the threat faced by the system based 
on other information available, then makes a decision that whether 
to shutdown the system, to kill the anomalous process or to resume 
its execution. 
4.4 Collecting Normal Behavior Profile 
Most of the information in normal behavior profile can be 
collected by the compiler. For direct jumps, the compiler can 
easily get the correct offset during compilation. For indirect jumps 
that many have multiple targets,  the compiler can get a set of 
possible targets through pointer analysis. Normally, the number of 
possible targets for indirect jumps are very limited. To tell whether 
a taken or not-taken direct branch is normal, profiling of normal 
program execution in a secure environment has to be done.  
4.5 Other Hardware Techniques to Reduce 
Performance Penalty 
In this section, we suggest several hardware optimizations to 
improve the performance of our anomaly detection system. In 
particular, we propose prefetching of normal behavior profile, 
separate cache space for normal behavior profile and customized 
BTB design. 
Prefetching and Separate Normal Profile Cache 
There is no upper bound for the size of the normal behavior 
profile, so it may be too big to be stored entirely on-chip. In some 
cases, we have to load the needed normal profile data from 
external memory and it might cost  significant latency. In our 
scheme, the fetching of normal profile data is done in parallel with 
the execution of the instruction, thus the latency due to profile data 
fetching is largely hidden.  
Prefetching may further reduce the data fetch latency. If a 
fetch of normal profile data causes a cache miss, the instruction 
execution may not be able to cover the latency fully. During our 
experiments, we observe that a significant part of misses due to 
normal behavior profile data fetching are caused by the fetching of 
special jump entries, due to their lack of locality. Thus, we propose 
compiler-assisted special jump entry prefetching. In particular, the 
compiler inserts prefetching instructions for all the indirect jump 
instructions in each function at the function entry point. The 
prefetching instruction just gives some hint to the processor, but 
does not grant any read/write access of normal behavior profile 
data to the program being monitored. Since there are only a few of 
indirect jumps in each function, the code increase is minor. Our 
results show that prefetching helps reduce performance 
degradation further. 
Under our default scheme, the profile data share caches with 
original program code and data, which leads to competition of 
shared cache space and degradation of cache performance. Thus, 
we propose a separate cache for profile data to avoid the cache 
pollution. The cache can be very small compared with the size of 
original on-chip caches for the execution of the program.  
Customized BTB 
Branch target buffer (BTB) is widely used in modern 
processors to remember the branch target of a branch instruction 
and to help provide next instruction fetch address at the end of 
instruction fetch stage.  
Assume a tagged BTB design, each BTB entry contains a 
jump PC address as tag and the target address of the jump 
instruction. It is easy to see that the structure is similar to the 
normal_jump_entry defined in Figure 8.b, leading to the chance of 
utilizing BTB to reduce performance overhead further. In our 
customized BTB design, each BTB entry not only records the 
target address of the jump but also includes two additional bits in 
the normal_jump_entry – taken and nottaken. In this way, each 
BTB entry can contain the normal behavior profile information for 
a direct jump. For indirect jumps with multiple targets, one BTB 
entry is not enough. Whenever a new direct jump instruction is 
updated into BTB, we not only update the target address of the 
BTB entry, but also the two additional bits. The BTB can function 
as before. The only extension is the two additional bits. With 
customized BTB design, for each direct jump instruction, if the 
jump hits in the BTB (which we will know in the instruction fetch 
stage) the detector does not need to fetch corresponding normal 
behavior profile data from the cache since it is already in the BTB. 
In other words, the customized BTB can behave like a cache for 
normal profile data of direct jump instructions. Large BTB is 
common in modern processors and it can achieve a good hit rate. 
Thus, the traffic due to normal_jump_entry fetching under our 
customized BTB design is reduced greatly. 
4.6 Example Revisited 
The example in Figure 5 illustrates an attack that all previous 
anomaly detection approaches cannot detect. Under our hardware 
anomaly detection system with dynamic control flow checking, 
when f() is called in line 2, the return address is pushed to the top 
of the RA stack. Therefore, upon returning from f(), a mismatch 
between the tampered return address and the return address popped 
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from the RA stack will definitely be caught by the detector. 
5. Other Considerations 
DLLs are shared by many processes and are loaded on 
demand. They can be protected in the same way as normal 
programs, as long as normal behavior profile data are created and 
loaded together with the DLL. The instruction addresses in the 
normal profile data for a DLL should be relative to the beginning 
of the DLL, so that they are independent to the actual location the 
DLL is loaded to the program’s virtual address space. Another 
point is that normal behavior may be different when a DLL is 
invoked by different applications. So it is hard to define “normal” 
for a DLL in some cases. However, the CFG of the DLL is static 
and fixed. Our hardware anomaly detection system can verify the 
control flow of the DLL anyway. When invoking a function in a 
DLL, there should be some way to verify if the right DLL is called 
to avoid a Trojan version of the DLL. This can be fulfilled with 
certain authentication mechanism.  
System calls like fork and exec family can create copies of 
the running process or overwrite it completely. Since the XOM 
architecture and OS [12] can handle this securely, our anomaly 
detection system simply follows their framework. A copy of the 
normal profile data can be created if the process is forked. Also, 
new normal profile data can be loaded to the memory space if an 
exec family system call is executed. 
To support multi-threading, multiple RA stacks have to be 
deployed and each thread has its own RA stack.  
The setjmp()/longjmp() functions are used in exception and 
error handling. setjmp() saves the stack context and other machine 
state for later recovery by invoking longjmp(). Thus, after 
longjmp(), the program resumes as if the setjmp() just returns. 
longjmp() will confuse RA stack checking since the function 
calling longjmp() never returns, as well as its active parent 
functions. longjmp() function is actually implemented by an 
indirect jump instruction. The possible jump targets can be 
collected through compiler analysis too. The peculiarity of 
longjmp() function is that the jump target can cross functions. To 
avoid the false positives caused by longjmp(), first the detector has 
to be aware of the particular indirect jump instruction, which can 
be done easily by monitoring PC addresses. Second, after the 
execution of this particular indirect jump instruction, the RA stack 
has to be recovered to the particular state when setjmp() is called. 
To support this, whenever setjmp() is called, a snapshot of current 
RA stack has to be taken and recorded by the detector for later 
recovering. The detector can detect the execution of setjmp() by 
monitoring PC addresses. 
6. Evaluation 
Our hardware anomaly detection system is proposed as an 
enhancement to the current XOM-based secure processor designs. 
In our experiments, we implemented a XOM-based secure 
processor with both confidentiality and integrity protection as our 
baseline processor. In particular, we implemented the OTP (one 
time pad) encryption scheme proposed in [9], which achieves very 
low encryption/decryption overhead. We also implemented the 
integrity checking scheme proposed in [11]. All the hardware 
modeling is done in Simplescalar toolset [16]. We choose all 
SPEC2000 integer programs as benchmarks. We perform our 
experiments based on SimPoint [17] to capture the characteristics 
of benchmarks quickly and accurately. Each benchmark is first 
fast-forwarded according to SimPoint then simulated by 100M 
instructions. The default parameters of our processor model is 
shown in Table 1.  




Clock frequency 1 GHz L1 I/D 64K, 2 way, 2 cycle 
32B block 
Fetch queue 32 entries Unified L2 512K, 4way, 32B block
Latency 10 cycles 
Decode width 8 Memory bus 200M, 8 Byte wide 
Issue width 8 Memory latency first chunk: 80 cycles, 
inter chunk: 5 cycles 
Commit width 8 SNC cache 64K, 4way, 32B 
RUU size 128 Encryption/ 
Decryption latency 
50ns 
LSQ size 64 TLB miss 30 cycles 
Branch predictor 2 Level   
 
Figure 9 show the distribution of jump instructions. On 
average, 12% of total program instructions are jumps and only 
1.5% of program instructions are indirect jumps (including indirect 
branches and indirect calls). The above result shows that our staged 
anomaly detection system is very reasonable. First stage is the 
fastest and processes all instructions. Only around 12% instructions 
reach the second stage, which is slower. Finally, only around 2% 
instructions reach the slowest third stage. 
Figure 10 shows the performance degradation of our 
hardware anomaly detection system over the baseline processor. 
Normalized IPC over our default configuration is shown. By 
default, the normal behavior profile data shares L1 data cache and 
L2 cache with the original program code and data. There are no 
other architectural optimizations enabled in default configuration. 
Our default configuration is chosen to avoid the hardware cost and 
modification to current processor designs as much as possible. On 
average, the performance degradation due to anomaly detection 
under default configuration is only 0.96%. Benchmark gcc has 
worst degradation – 2.7%. Even without other optimizations, our 
anomaly detection system performs exceptionally well. The major 
reasons are: 1) The fetching of normal behavior profile data is 
performed in parallel with the execution of the instruction. Most of 
the profile data fetching latency is hidden. 2) We discard the 
simple hash table design and choose groupwise hash table to 
improve the locality of profile data accesses. 3) The size of the 
profile data is small. Normally the profile data is  less than 20% of 
the program code size. Accesses to this small piece of data do not 













































































Figure 10. Normalized IPC under Default Configuration. 
 
Figure 11 shows the effect of a separate cache for normal behavior 
profile data. Four configurations are shown. Default (without 
separate cache), 4K separate cache, 8K separate cache and 16K 
separate cache. The separate cache is 4-way and 32B block size. 
With a separate cache, the performance of original L1 and L2 
caches will not be degraded, leading to performance improvement. 
Since many benchmarks have near zero performance degradation 
even under default configuration, a separate cache does little for 
them. For several benchmarks suffering relatively big performance 
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Figure 11. Separate Cache for Normal Behavior Profile 
 
Figure 12 shows the results of prefetching and customized BTB 
optimizations. The IPC is normalized to the default configuration. 
From the results, prefetching is ineffective to improve the 
performance. Although prefetching can reduce latency of some 
accesses, it may also kick out some active blocks in cache thus 
degrade cache performance. To fully exploit the power of 
prefetching, it takes advanced prefetching algorithm to reduce the 
negative effect of prefetching as much as possible, which is not the 
main interest of our paper, since the performance degradation is 
already minor under basic configuration. On the other hand, our 
customized BTB design leads to apparent performance 
improvement for some benchmarks. BTB optimization is more 
efficient because it eliminates a significant portion of accesses to 































Figure 12. Prefetching and Customized BTB Optimization. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a hardware-based approach to 
verify the control flow of target applications dynamically and to 
detect anomalous executions. With hardware support, our approach 
offers multiple advantages over software based solutions including 
near zero performance degradation, much stronger detection 
capability and zero-latency reaction upon anomaly thus much 
better security. 
The performance degradation is extremely low (worst case -
2.7% for gcc) mainly due to the efficient design  of our staged 
checking pipeline (only 12 % instructions reach second stage and 
2% reach the third stage). A second reason for low degradation is 
checking for intrusion is done in parallel with the instruction 
execution causing almost no extra overheads. The guarantees 
offered and low degradation make this scheme a practical approach 
to detect intrusion in hardware. This also allows intrusion 
prevention to be done which is not possible otherwise due to a 
considerable lag between the start and detection of the intrusion.  
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